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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JACKIE LEE SYDDALL,
Appelant
vs.

CASE NO. 10950

TURNER, Warden
Utah State Prison,

JOHN W.

Respondent

BRIEF OF APPEALANT
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third
District Court for Salt LakeCounty, Hon.
3tewart M. Hanson, Presiding Judge.

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The i~ppellant brought a petition in the Third
Judicial District Court for a writ of habeas
: corpus against the warden of the Utah State
Frison, alleging the illegality of his confinement on a commitment which was based on a
1

conviction for burglary obtained without due
Process of law.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, District
Judge, called the matter, Vivil No. 167509, on
for hearing the 10th day of March, 1967, and

having heard both Plaintiff and Defendant took
said cause under advisement.
April 13, 1967, an Order denying Plaintiff's
petition for habeas corpus in

Civi~

No. 167509,

together with the Memorandum Decision was entered
and

filed (R-22).
April 21, 1967 appellant filed Notice of Appeal

Designation of Record and AffidaYit of Iapecuniosity
(R-23, 24, 25).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was originally confined in the
Utah State Prison pursuant to sentence illpoaed

November 25, 1955, for the crime of Second Degree
Burglary.
Appellent was arrested by REX HUNTSMAN, Sheriff,
Sevier County, State of Utah, on the 15th day of
September, 1955, and lodged in the Sevier County
Jail, where he remained throughout the proceedings.
2

complained of in his petition for writ of
corpus.

hab~

Appellant was seventeen (17) years old

at that time.
After being in the Sevier County Jail about
1

twenty-five ( 25) days a warrant issued for
appellant's arrest, and two days later, on the
10th day of October, 1955, said warrant was

served upon appelant and he was taken before the
Hon. KEN CH .MBERLAIN, presiding judge in the
Juvenile Court of the Fourth Juvenile District

(Ex. D-2/Transcript of Docket).

A 11 Document" was

typed and appellant was requested to sign, but
being a Juvenile, a 17-year-old-young, Appellant

would not sign his name to anything, because of the
fact that he did not understand the proceedings

taking place against him (Ex D-1, Fage 2).
Appellant later learned that he had been

reque~ted

to waive all his Constitutional and Procedural
Rights and Guarantees.
October 11, 1955, appeallant was taken before
the said Juvenile Court, where he was advised that

! he had been charged with a criminal offense which

could be transferred to the District Court.

3

The

court then read the charges to Appellant and,
subsequently called Sheriff Rex Huntsman to
testify against him, {Ex. D-1), the sheriff was
sworn and gave testimony against Appellant.
Appellant did not cross-examine the Sheriff.
Appellant was a 17-year-old-youth, without the
aid of legal counsel.

Appellant had never had a

Preliminary Hearing in his life.

Appellant waa

lost and confused, he had been in jail 25 da7s.
Appellant was bound over to Diatrict Court to
stand trial on the aoove mentioned Burglary charge.
The Records are incomplete; and tho•• available
are in conflict as to whether or not Pr•liainary
Hearing and Legal Counsel were in fact waived, the
"Docment 11 prepared for Appellant ( s signature was
not signed by Appellant.
October 11, 1955, the transcript of docket and
all papers in this matter were transmitted to the

Sixth Judicial District Court {R-D-2, page 2,
paragraph 4) •
October 10, 1955 Appellant was before the
Sixth Judicial District Court for arraignment and
Plea.

The Information was read and filed.

Appellant

Appellant was never advised that he could b
sent to Prison, and if fact, was led to believe
he would be returned to the State Industrial School.

The fact that Appellant changed his plea six (6)
times between October 10th and November 23rd shows
his state of mind---the mind of a 17-year-old youth.

After being bound over to stand trial in the
District Court by the Honorable Ken Chamberlain,
Juvenile Judge, the records show that the Honorable
Ken Chamberlain appeared for the State of Utah as

Disctrict Attorney, against Appellant.
Being incomplete, the records fail to show
that Appellant appeared before a District Court
Judge

during his first six (6) appearances in the

Sixth Judicial District Court.

On the 23rd day of

November, Appellant appeared in courr for the seventh
time, and records show the Honorable John L. Sevy,
Jr, sentenced him to the Utah State Prison.

An examination of the records in the instant
case give evidence to only one fact:
impeach themselves.

5

the records

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appeallant submits the decision of the lower
court should be reversed and the case be remanded
New Trial.

for a

ARGUMENT

POINT I
E~UAL

APPELLANT HAS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS AND
PROTECTION OF LAWS.
That which law requires and makes essential

on trial of defendant, charged with felony, cannot
be dispensed wth, either by consent of defendant
or by his failure to object to unauthorized methods

pursued by those in authority. (State v. Mannion,

l9U. 505, 57 P. 542, 45 LRA 638, 75 Am. St. Rep.
753).
Does an illegal arrest--without more--violate
the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendm.ent Due
Process?

The lower court in denying Appellant's

petition for habeas corpus says no.

The United

States Supreme Court has said that it does.

See

Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01,

4 L.Ed. 2d 134-38, 80 s.ct. 168, 170 (1959);
fil.ordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480,

6

485-86,

2 L.Ed.2d

1503, 1509, 78

s.ct.

12'+5, i250 (1958-);

Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5, 71 L. Ed.
505, 508, 47 S. Ct. 250, 251, (192?).

Both logic and

History point to the same di.rectien. •. The Fourth
Amendment guarantees "The right of the people to

be secure, " first of all,

11

:1.n taeir per•ona" &11.d

an unreasonable eeizure of the person. seems to be
a greater invasion of 1i'ber<ty B.lld privacy tban
the similar seizure of one' a effeota .. "

See

ia~t

at 46-4?; Foote, Safeguards in the Lav of :.Atrn.tt·
52 N.W.U.L. Rev. 16, 41.-42 (1957).
Appellant submitB- that be was

arres~

lllUi lield

twenty-five (25} lia.ya wi.thout a warrant »ei.Dc
issued; that his arrest waa illegal, aa4 :theret"ore;
"No

magistrate .sha:ll have juriaidi.ctioa over, any

defendant who has been brou«ht before- hia bJ'
virture of an illega·l arreat. 11 (Jlote.: · 100 11.. ·Pa. L.
1

Rev. 1182, 1215 (1952).
POIN'l' II
AN INCOMPLETE RECORD IS A DENIAL OF DUE
PROC;:s;::;;:.; A.N"D E~UAL PROTECTION 'tl!-lERE POST-CONVICTION AND/OR APPEAL IS X MATTER -Oi' ·RIGHT• ·

In Utah "an appeal ma1 'be taken -by the d_..
fendant,

(1) from a final judgment: o~ eoh'riA'ticlllal

7

\~'

rrom an order made, after judgment, effecting

the substantial rights of the party."

77-39-3, Utah Code Annoated, 1953.

Section

Thue, where

an appeal is a matter of right exercisable only
by

the defendant, or petition for habeas corpus

by

the defendant, who has means enough to pay for

a transcript in advance there is a denaial of

equal proc tion within the meaning of tlle 14th

Amendment.

The reasoning of-the court is that the

financial ability to pay costs in a4vance b .. re no
rational relationship to a defettdaat'a·guilt or

innocence and cannot be used to justify detrlTtng
defendent of a fair trial or hearing.

hrtker- 9

there is no meaningful dietinctio-ll between a rule
which would deny the poor the "right to defft4 :
themsevea in court and one wkich e'ffecti.-Yely
denies the poo-r -Of an adequate appellate renew,

or examination of reeor'de in habeaa cerp\le hearing,
by demanding coats be pain in advan••·

(Griftla v.

lllinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
The financil ability to pay bears no-mere
rational relationship to a defendant'a guilt or
innocence than does the accident of the terum an4

neither can be used to jvstify depriving a

defendant of a fair trial.

If appellant had been

charged with a misdemeanor in the District Court
he would have been supplied with a verbatim record
for purposes of post-conviction remedies or appeal,
since a reporter would have been present during the
entire trial.

Having been charged, however, in

the Juvenile court he was unable to obtain a complete record.

Thus, Appellant was denied due process

and equal protection within the meaning of the ll+th
Amendment.

It is not sufficient to state that the

part of the records not lost is sufficient to provide a clear record from which to exercise the
right to post-conviction remedies, and/or appeal
for no one can say that what is missing is
immaterial without kno :ing exactly what
is being discounted.

information

An incomplete record is just

as bad as no record at all for the testimony or
evidence which was most clearly prejudicial or
erroneous affording grounds !or a writ ot habeas
corpus may very well be that which is lost.

There

is no rational basis for distinguising between
treatment in the District Court and in the Juvenile
Court with regard to an adult offender charged with
9

a crime for the reason that Appellant was a
juvenile at that time.
D:.ie

Process
In a case where the court reporter had died

prior to completing the transcription of his notes
and another person was allowed to try and decipher
the notes with the aid of statements from the Judge
and prosecutor, in the face of a formal protest
from the Court Reporter's Association of Los
Angeles to the effect that there was grave doubt
that anyone could furnish a usable transcript
from the notes due to the fact that many portions
were completely indecipherable, the Supreme Court
held that an ex parte settlement of the state
court record violated petitioner's right to procedural due process in not having been represented at
the hearings either in person or by counsel.

The

order of the court was to remand to the District
Court to enter an order to allow California a
reasonable time to perfect the record, petitioner
being represented at such hearings and that failing
to do so wtthin six months petitioner should be
released.

The reasoning of the court was the

iue process £lause of the 14th .Amendment re'luired the opportunity for review on a reviewable

record.

Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).

~n Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937),

the Supreme Court laid down the following guide
lines as to whether state procedure violates 14th
Amendment standards of due process:
"Does it violate those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice
which die at the bese of all our
civil and political institutions?"
••• Or is it "so acute and shocking
that our policy will not endure it?"
The court in PALKO in rejecting the defendant's
1

claim of double-jeopardy as a bar to a new trial
reasoned that "if the trial had been infected
with error adverse to the accused, there might

have been a review at his instance, and so often ae
1

necessary to purge the taint.

A.

reciprocal

privilege has now been granted the state."

~

!.:.._Connecticut, supra.
In the stand case appellant's contention
that an incomplete record is a denial of due
process for purposes of his right to a full and
complete hearing in habeas corpus proceeding unless
this court reverse the lower court's judgment and

grants appellant a new trial.

It is a violation of

fundamental principles of liberty and justice to
11

, say that one has a right to post-conviction remedy
, on the basis of error as shown by the record when

'the record is incomplete.

The very proof of error

which might have deprived Appellant of due process
1

may be hidden in the portion which was lost.

(See

;State v. Baum, '+7 Utah 7, 151 Pac 518 ( 1915); and
"Primarily, interpretation of written document
I'

is

for trial court, but reviewing court ia not

~und

by trial court's interpretation based on

extrinsic evidence in which there is some conflict."
~re

Golder' a Estate, 185 P. 2d 54.

POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ZRRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT
ENTITLED TO DISCHARGE IN HABEAS CORPUS WHERE
HL .iAS DENI:2;D LEG~U. COUNSEL DURING ORIGINn.L TRIAL
/\ND CONVICTION.
IS NOT

Available records show that Appellant was
Jailed October 7, 1955--.Appellant contenda he was
anested and jailed September 15 1 1955--andi the
iarrant was issued October

8, 19551 served October

Wth, 1955 (Ex. P-10; Tr. 58, 59.)
12

Recital of the record (Ex. D-3) alleges that
the court appointed J. Vernon Erickson as counsel,
at the request of Appellant for legal assistance.
Appellant contends that his mother asked Mr.
6rickson to see what he could do for Appellant
(Bx. 35);

that Mr. Erickson advised that he had

talked with the judge, and there was no need to
be concerned because he would be placed on probation (Tr 36, 37);

Appellant's mother, Mrs.

Rasmussen, testified that she went and talked with
Mr.

Erickson ('rr. 75), to see if he would bAlp.

The manner by which Mr. Erickson came to be the
counsel of record in Appellant's case is unimportant
at this time, notwithstanding the

fa~t

that

Appellant was released from the jail during the
day

time to go and work for Mr. Erickson (Tr. 37).

The point complained of is that Appellant had no
lec,al counsel until the 24th day of October, 1955,
some 17 to 42 days after being arrested and placed
in jail, subsequently to two (2) pleas of guilty

and waiver ofpreliminay hearing and legal counsel
!"he only evidence, if any, ever introduced in an1
court was the testimony of Rex Huntsman, Sheriff,
taken on the 10th day of October in the Juvenile
,~

Court (Ex. D-2, 3).

Appellant was a seventeen

(17) year old youth; never before had been in a
District Court,

Adding confusion to confusion,

Ken Chamberlain was Juvenile Judge who bound

Appelant over to stand trial in

Distr~t

Court,

and when Appellant was brought into District Court,
~en

Chamberlain appeared as Prosecutor for the

State against Appellant.

Can it be said that a

seventeen year old boy could posibly understand
1

the procedure complained in the instand case?

No.

"Sven the intelligent and educated layman
has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with a crime,
he is incapable, generally, of determi.Ung
for himself whether the indictment is good
or bad. He is unfamiliar tiwth the rules
of evidence.
Left without the aid of
counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetant evidence, or evidence irrelevant
to the issue or otherwise inadmissable.
iie lacks both the skill and knowlejge
ltR adequately to prepare his defense, even
though be have a perfect one. He require•
the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against. him. Withou.t
it, though he is not guilty, he faces the
danger of vonviction because he doea not
know how to estalish his innocence. If that
be true of men of intellignence, how much
more true of men of ignorance and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect." Powel v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963) •

...... .1.ut. (pro tee i.i..:·'·

Appellant was a 17 year old boy. His opponent
was the Honorable Ken Chamberlain, Judge, and
District Attorney.
"The Constitutional Rights of an individual
are fundamental and inallienable rights
which cannot be destroyed nor diminished
by legislative act, or failure to act1 and
the duty of seeing that such rights are
protected and preserved inYiolate falls
squarely upon shoulders of judiciary, and
the preformance of the duty is one of the
inherent powers of the court." State v. Briggs,
255 F. 2d 1055 (1953).

"A judgment not void on its face ma.1 be
attacked on ground that prisoner did not
completently and intelligently waiYe right
guaranteed to him under Federal and State
Constitutions to have aid of counsel befor•
entering plea of guilty." Wilken v. Squier,
309 P. 2d 746; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
v. Claudy, 76 S.Ct. 223 (1955).
Appellant submits that the Juvenile Court waa
without authority

or

Jurisdiction to dispose of

his constitutional rights and guarantees to have
a preliminary hearing and the aid of legal counsel.
Appellant was a juvenile delinquent who had been
illegally arrested without a warrant and detained
in the Sevier County Jail in violation of his
Federal and State Constitutional Rights and
Guarantees.

In defiance of such unlawful and

unconsittutional actions as complained of, there
is no need for Appellant to cite the great array
of

authorities condemning such treatment.

Justice

for the Appellant (protection of his rights) alone

is sought.

CONCLUSION
The Appellant respectfully submits that the
lower court erred in den7ing his application for
habeas corpus, and a reversal of the lower court's
ruling should be had, appellant should be discharged from conviction and a new trial ordered
in the instant case.

Appellant urges that this

court reverse and remand the cause.
Respectfull1 submitted,

